eBusiness Weekly
Dr Tinashe Nyamunda
Many people assume that statecraft and chieftaincy have no bearing on the economic fortunes of Zimbabwe when in fact they are inextricably connected. Traditional leadership can be very instrumental in development at a local level within rural areas, which can improve people’s lives, put money in their pockets and instigate a certain and very specific kind of development.
We may not see this because of the nature of the state in Zimbabwe where power is concentrated in central Government, and to some degree, in local government, but with very little devolution to traditional authority. I will use the aid of a comparative example here to explain this.
Admittedly, people may argue about the division between the modern state and traditional authority, but this is a huge fallacy. The distinction is more imagined than real because the manner in which they affect the economy do not necessarily does not vary according to sector. Even the distinction between legal and customary law gives little credence to this assertion.
In many cases in Zimbabwe, the authority of traditional chiefs is only as influential to the extent that central Government allows it and the very existence of chiefs, despite claims to chieftainships through belonging to certain genealogies, is also very murky and closely connected to state interests.
The colonial state was very instrumental in blurring labelling chiefs as “traditional’ authority, but more appropriately, the authority of chiefs was confined to the limits determined by the colonial state, to facilitate the artificial distinction between the modern and the traditional (read archaic in certain circumstances), the money driven economy and the barter system. This conception carried over with little alteration to the post-colonial era.
But to fully understand the importance of chiefs and the influence they could yield for development and improving people’s lives, certain comparisons could be useful. At present, their influence is limited to local courts where they preside over domestic disputes and very little else with little at their disposal as far as financial resources are concerned.
The chiefs are only custodians of the land in rural areas as far as presiding over the domestic issues is concerned, but the land in Zimbabwe and other laws governing the people are vested in the central state.
But in other African countries, there are different models where African chiefs still wield significant authority in terms of how they govern their local constituencies. In Ghana, for example, the Asantehene still sits on the golden stool and commands a lot of influence on the central government.
He and not the government, is the custodian of the land. The leader’s authority extends as far as being empowered to solicit external investors into his area. For this reason, although gold mines in Ashanti pay taxes to the central state, they still also pay royalties to the institution of the chief.
Because the chief has a lot of resources at his disposal, he can build museums, fund fellowships at all levels to the point where the traditional leader can send brilliant students overseas to study. The chief commands a lot of moral authority, such that he can pass decrees that whoever leaves his area for opportunities elsewhere, has to invest back home.
There, wealth is measured not just in terms of bank balances and urban assets, but in terms of the amount of clients that one has back home, the extent to which one has helped his kinsmen. While this ethic is still very strong among Zimbabweans, it is at the discretion of individuals who still want to keep that tradition, but not something upheld as part of the recognised authority of a chief who commands the respect of his subjects.
In fact, the basic welfare of chiefs in Zimbabwe is entirely dependent on the central state, which provides salaries, vehicles and a few other necessities. Chiefs also benefit from other local fines given to people found guilty of petty crimes tried at the customary courts. Beyond that, they do not command sufficient resources to instigate development of note in the areas they live.
The chiefs’ financial situation in Zimbabwe is a far cry from that of the Asantehene, and other chiefs in Ghana whose voices carry enough weight to determine the trajectory of national policy.
Another historical example could be that of chiefs in (Northern Rhodesia) colonial Zambia for example. The chiefs were allowed to have 10 percent of locally collected taxes, which remained in the Treasury to be used for local public works such as construction of clinics, schools and related requirements. To this extent, the chiefs could steer development in their localities. Given their proximity to local communities, they could easily identify areas of need and address them immediately.
In a book by WalimaKalusa, a historian who has studied the role of chiefs in colonial and postcolonial Zambia, if a window pane was broken at a local hall, it was easier for the staff to consult the chief who was easily accessible and who could then provide the resources for repair work.
But in the postcolonial period, all the power and resources was transferred to central Government thus limiting the authority and influence of the chiefs.
Moreover, central Government was located far away from remote parts of Zambia, meaning that the Government became inaccessible and therefore development of the areas was increasingly neglected by what became a political and metropolitan centre in the seat of the nation’s power.
What I am suggesting is the need for a degree of devolution of power. Centralising it in the capital complicates governance of remote areas classified as rural and inaccessible to administrators largely located in central Government. Even the so called local authorities are still conduits of the central state and do not wield as much influence and respect as do the chiefs. They are more in touch with the very specific needs of their people more than young technocrats who work as district administrators and invariably resemble Native Commissioners. In many cases, administrators are often posted to areas they do not originate from and tend to take time to fully grasp the traditions of any area they work in.
Moreover, where the state is the custodian of the land, its distribution without a full consultation of the chiefs who have vested interests in traditions surrounding its use is problematic. State officials end up distributing unfairly, which sometimes ends creating undedicated farmers, people who own land, but without vested interest or deep connection with it. This has implications on how the land is developed, the relationship of the individual to it and ultimately what it would produce.
Also, the modern central state has become increasingly corrupted across Africa, particularly because of the concentration of the nation’s resources within its Treasury. This is where we end up with stories of “tenderprenuership”, rampant corruption, patronage and outright pilferage by officials.
This is not to say there is need to go back to the pre-colonial Africa system to an assertion that chiefs cannot be corrupted, but in a situation where power is devolved and allocation of resources decentralised to a local level, increased accountability can curb corruption to significant degree.
Local people with direct access to their chiefs and headmen can all contribute on how resources should be used than a case where only the central state is the custodian of all the resources of the nation. What I suggest here is an example of how development can be instituted from below.
Using the governance approach I have suggested, it would be easier to set developmental targets. Markets can be in touch with specific local authorities that have direct access to the people under them and what they produce; either from mining or farming will be much better coordinated.
This scenario may benefit local people much better than technocratic state imposing national policies that may not fit every context.
I am suggesting that considering a certain degree of devolving power to chiefs, giving them increased authority over land as custodians and allowing them more resources to govern may be one way of thinking about economic recovery and development from below, as the current system has been corrupted by concentrating most of the power in the central state.
